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7  5222,  T el. Q14)922-5  1.65.,  F  ax.  (214)922-5  194.In an attempt to combine the alleged credibility enhancing  aspecls  of a long term
commitment to a fixed exchange  rate with the short term flexibility  of fluctuating rates,
some countries are moving to unilateral target zones  for their exchange  rates.  Recent
theoretical considerations show that opening a target zone can increase the amount of
monetary policy flexibility  without gving up the commitment to low inllation  [Svensson
19921  and that unilateral target zones  can survive a surprisingly long time [Dumas and
Svensson  19911.  Further, Krugman  and Miller (1993)  argue  that if traders  use  so-called
"stop-loss"  lvading rules, target zones  can change  destabilizing speculation into stablizing
speculation. The increased  flexibility  that a target zone arrangement gives the stabilizing
characteristics of credible fixed exchange  rate regimes provides a rational for adopting
unilateral target zones especially in I-atin America.
The purpose of this study is to gauge  the performance of unilateral target zor;.e
arrangements  in two I-atin American countries, Mexico and Chile.  In doing so we look
at the institutional  and historical evolution of these exchange  rate regimes. We then
deal with performance in a more formal fashion by looking at the stochastic  behavior of
the exchange  rates and at the credibility of the targets zones  using techniques developed
by Svensson  (1991) and Chen and Giovannini 17992a L992b,  and 19931. The results
indicate both the Chilean and Mexican arrangements  have been credible.  Further, tle
Mexican band concentrated on stabilizing the exchange  rate in order to slow inflation
while the Chilean zone emphasizes  nominal exchange  rate flexibility  to preserve real
exchange  rate stability.'  Finally, the probability distributions of the exchange  rates within
'For a discussion  of the trade-offs,  see  Welch and Mcl-eod (1993).
1the bands indicates that the Mexican authorities have intervened heavily while the
exchange  rate is in the band while tle  Chilean central bank has intervened rnainly when
the exchange  rate reached the upper or lower limit  of the band.
But the arrangements  themselves  took very different forms in each of these
countries.  Mexico imposed a nominal exchange  rate band with a fixed floor  and a
ceiling which depreciates  at a set amount per day. The Chilean band, on the other hand,
sets a central parity with the objective of maintaining the real exchange  rate.  The width
of the band has been varied between 5Vo and l07o over time.  The difficult  task is to
glean which asangement succeeds  at attaining which objectives.
Gaugrng the usefulness  of these different forms of target zones  necessarily
involves the consideration of the policymakers objectives for the zone.  In both the
Mexican and Chilean cases,  the movemert to a more flexible exchange  rate is related to
the memories of the collapse of their fixed exchange  regimes in the beginning of the
1980s. Until  then, both countries had tried to use their dollar exchange  rates as nominal
anchors for the domestic price level.  In the subsequent  period, each country used the
nominal exchange  rate to improve their current account deficits by trying to maintain the
real exchange  rate.  Inflation,  especially in the Mexican case,  remained until very
recently stubbornly high.
Since  1988,  Mexico has  purposely  slowed  the rate of depreciation  of the peso
below the inflation  rate in an effort to bring inllation  down in conjunction with wage and
aprice guidelines and massive  fiscal adjustrnent." The idea is that a fixed exchagte rate
arrangement is only sustainable  with low inflation.  And, hence, a commitment to a fixed
or slowly depreciating exchange  rate is a commitment to low inflation,  Seen in these
terms, the Mexicans recertly have given great importance to low inflation.  Chileans,
despite full  fiscal adjustment, are more concemed with external balance and have tried
to maintain crlrent  account surpluses  in the face of increased capital inflows.
Consequently,  inflation  has fallen more slowly then in the Mexican case.
Such a brief background to the adoption of the target zones leaves out many
important historical  considerations  leading  to the adoption  of these  exchange  rate
arrangements. But a full  description lies beyond the scope of this paper.  We now briefly
consider, however, the historical performance of the Mexican and Chilean target zones.
The Mexican Target Zone
On 1.0  November 1991.  the Banco de Mexico announced  that it would decrease  the rate
of crawl of the peso from 40 to 20 centavos  a day but only the ask price would move.
The objective was to increase the bid-ask spread to 60 pesos  by March 15 1992  in the
interbank market.  The risk of such a move was that market participants would view it as
a signal that the exchange  rate was no longer viable and that the government no longer
could honor its commitment to lower inflation.  The reaction to the band, however, was
just the opposite.  Bankers viewed an affangement which decreased  the Banco de
The  relationship between inflation  and devaluation is still controversial.  For a
review  of these  issues,  see  Mcleod  and Welch (1993).Mexico's role in the foreign exchange  market as very positive.  Subsequently,  the peso
moved to the strong edge of the band (appreciated in nominal terrns).  The reaction and
the importance of grving the peso/dollar  exchange  rate more market flexibility  seemed  to
have convinced the Mexican authorities to widen the zone.
On March 13 7992,  tie  Banco de Mexico chose  to continue widening the band
instead of resuming the ask-price slide of 20 pesos  a day.  The objective was to have a
5Vo  band by the end of the year.  The ability of tle  foreign exchange  market to handle
large movements in dollars clearly improved by the opening of the band in addition to
decreasirg the costs of sterilization.  In the week stafiing March 19, a large foreign
securities firm removed $500 million  from the market in one day which represents
roughly 20Vo  of the total daily volume ($3 billion)  for end of fiscal year cleanup,  In the
past, such a transaction would have caused  a panic and a run on the peso with all the
corresponding financial chaos. In this case,  however, tle  peso depreciated from 3062 to
3090. The operation was reversed  the next week and the peso appreciated back tc
around 3061.. At  no time did the peso threaten to go above the top of the target zore.
Calm reigned in the interbank market until  May and the zone was never close to being
threatened.  Small movements in the peso, however, caused  some rninor losses  to
brokers who are mostly long in pesos  (due to the interest differential).  The losses,  are
smaller than the transactions costs  of covered hedging. Consequently,  a latent demand
for expanding the current forward (cobertura market) or a futures market for dollars has
been  building.
In May and June 1992,  Mexican financial markets became nervous and illiquid.These developments  seemingly  came independent of economic fundamentals. Foreign
reseryes  continued to rise, inflation  continued to fall, manufactures exports continue to
grow, and the public sector borrowing requirement will  be negative this year.  The lack
of liquidity  stemned from actions taken by the Banco de Mexico in early April  to
decrease  the banking system's  exposure  to foreign loans by limiting  foreign exchange
liabilities  of banks to 10Vo  of total assets. Banks then started prepaying their loans from
foreign sources  in late April  and early May,  Additionally,  the new pension program
came on line which had to be funded by the banks decreasing  available credit for other
purposes. AII this combined to push interest rates up and weakened the peso within the
inter-bank market target zone (Figures 1).  The interest rate on CETES moved out of a
range compatible with complete credibility of the exchange  rate larget zone.
Mexican markets continued extremely volatile during U.S. presidential year as the
future of the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations became ambiguous.
Mexico's financial markets are very sensitive  to such news because  Mexico's economic
policies  are based  upon an ever  increasing  integration  with the United States. The
Banco de Mexico continued to kept interest rates high at around 17Vo  to bing  hflation
closer  to the U.S. Ievel.
By August, the exchange  rate in the interba.nk market had been effectively
stabilized by the Banco de Mexico (Figure 1).  But expectations  of devaluation were still
strong.  Capital moved in and out of Mexico according to these expectations  and
developments  on the stock market.
Complicating matters were losses  emanating from the low real interest rates on anissue of inflation  indexed bonds (Ajustabonos).  The June 17 auction of Ajustabonos
were sold set the real interest rc;te  aI 3.5Eo  per year before the recent increase in interest
rates.  A good portion  of these bonds were purchased  by fixed income money market
accounts  which were paying higher interest rates to fund their position.  I-osses  are
estimated at around $1 billion.  Further, the recently privatized Banco Intemacional had
a large portion  of its money market portfolio  in these bonds. The imminent large losses
were avoided by a swap  with the Mexican government at par of  Ajustabonos  for CETES
which are earning llVo.  't\e  manoeuwe  created  turmoil because  the other banks
demanded equal treatment.  The problems ultimately led to the relaxation of the
restrictions on foreign borrowing by Mexican banks and the problems seem to have
abated for now.
The zeal to bring inflation  down in Mexico slowed economic growth dramatically
in the second  half of 1992  to around  2.5V0  as opposed  to the expected  4.0Vo,  The U.S.
presidential election campaigns  increased  the uncertainty surrounding the ratification  of
the NAFTA  and subsequently  increased  uncertainty in Mexico.  Coupled with the ever
increasing current account deficit, this uncertainty caused  outflows of capital and
pressure on the exchange  rate from September  to November 1992, In November 1992,
the Mexican govemment decided as part of its renegotiated Pacto that the target zone
would be widened at a faster pace.
The reaction by the market has been surprisingly favorable. The exchange  rate
immediately started appreciating v/ithin the band, upward pressure  on interest rates
turned into downward pressure,  the stock market continued a recovery, and foreipcapital started  pouring  back  into Mexico. The Banco  de Mexico's  foreign reserve
position  continues  to strengthen  and  output growth  seems  to be improving.
The Chilean Target Zone
The collapse of the lixed exchange  rate regime in Chile in 1982  put serious stress  on the
financial system  due mainly to the increase in foreign debt service. Since the financial
collapse of 1982,  the Chileans have explicitly tried to maintain a cheap real value of the
peso to maintain output and profitability  of exports. Exchange  rate policy nonetheless
has gone through a number of changes  especially  in tenns of the width and central parity
of the exchange  rate band.
Between 1982  and 1.985,  Chileans followed an explicit crawling peg without
fluctuation bands based upon the "acuerdo"  parity set by the central bank.  In  1985,  the
Chileans opened a band of 2Vo  on each  side of this central parity.  What distinguishes
and complicates the analysis  of the credibility of the Chilean band is the fact that
realignment of the central parity is continuous. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the
exchange  rate and tle  target zone since 1985.'
A number of observations  can be made about the evolution of the taxget zone.
First, the exchange  rate has tended to stay near one of the edges  of the band.  Helpman
and l-eiderma.n (1992) aryrc that this reflects their concenn with fluctuations in the
price of copper.  Brisk fluctuations move the band from one edge of band to the other.
'For  a brief  comparison of the Chilean band with the Israeli band, see Helpman and
I-eiderman  (1992).These movements have at times caused  not only a large change  in the central parity but
also a widening of the band.  The first occurred in January 1988  when the band was
widened  to x. 3/o.  It was  widened  again  to !  SVo  in June L989. In each  of these  cases,
tlese widening or realignments occurred when the exchange  rate was bumping against
the upper edge of the band.  However, Chile, as well as Mexico and the rest of I-atin
Americq  began to experience  large capital inflows starting in  1990  and the exchange  rate
moved to the bottom of the band.
Sterilizing  these  capital inflows  - that is the purchase  of $4.5  billion in 1991  and
1992  - by the central bank became sigrrificantly. On January 23, t992, tle  central bank
undertook a large realignment of the central parity but this time it took the form of a
57o appteciation of the peso and a widening of the band to 70Va. Capital has continued
to flow to Chile despite this appreciation of the nominal (and of the real) peso dollar
exchange  rate and efforts to slow this in{low by throwing "sand in the wheels" of capital
account transactions.  These measures  include a) moving to a basket of currencies as
opposed to the dollar as the basis of changing the central parity and b) the establishment
of a ZOVo  reserve requirement for 90 days (later extended to one year) on foreigrr credits
lZahler  1992 and Banco Central de Chile 19921
The Chilean central bank has concentrated mainly on the flexibility  of the target
zone.  They are willing  to give up a certain amount of higher inflation  (or slower
deceleration of inflation)  to maintain their real exchange  rate [Dombusch and Fisher
19921  and accommodate  external shocks  such as changes  in tle  international price of
copper [Helpman and I-eidermar  1992)  and capital flows lZahler  7992].The Stochastic Properties of the Target Zones
In order to look at the stochastic  properties of exchange  rates in target zones,  we need to
carefully describe the different determinants of its behavior.  The most useful way to do
so is to decompose  the value of the (log of the) exchange  rate, s,,  into the central parity
of the target zone, cD  a.nd  tie  deviation from the certral parity, x,
st-ct+xt
Here, by definitio4  -I"  s  t  <  I.  where I  is the radius or distance between tle  central
parity and the boundaries of the band.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the Mexican and Chilean exchange  rates movements  within
the bands. These numbers were generated by subtracting tle  central parity from the
observed exchange  rate.  Notice that the Mexican exchange  rate tends to stay in the
middle of the band and displays  a large degree of mean reversion.  The Chilean
exchange  rate has stayed close to the edges  of the band, toward the top in is early years
and later in the 1980s  toward the bottom.
A usual assumption  is that of uncovered interest rate parity where the (log)
interest rate differential  equals the expected rate of (overall) depreciation
i-i.=6,=EIAsrlIJ
Taking first differences of equation (1) and substituting into equation (2) yields
(1)
(2)
6,=E[Ac,lIJ  +EfAxrlIJ (3)Now the interest rate differential  equals the expected  realignment of the central
parity plus tle  expected depreciation within the band.  We can use this relationship to
estimate the size of the expected realignments. The interest rate differential  is observed.
Therefore, to get a measure of expected  realignments,  we need to estimate the stochastic
behavior of the exchange  rate within the band.  Once we do this, we can then say
something about the credibility of the target zones  in question.
The behavior of the exchange  rate within the band, however, is of some interest in
and of itself.  Krugman's (1991) original model shows  that in a credible exchange  rate
regime, the mere existence  of the target zone will  tend to stabilize exchange  rates
implyrng a nonlinear relationship between the exchange  rate and so-called
"fundamentals." I-east squares  estimates  of this nonlinear relationship, namely Flood,
Rose, and Mathieson (1992), have not found evidence of this so-called "honeymoon"
relationship.  However, such projection equation methods do not explicitly account for
the possible nonlinearity introduced by the targets zone.  Specifically, assuming  that
movements in the exchange  rate are normal when in fact that are bounded creates and
estimation problem.
Chen and Giovannini (1992a  and 1992b)  formulate a projection estimation
procedure u5ing a Box-Cox transformation which does not depend as highly on the
assumption about the projection equation error because  it assumes  only that the
probability  density function falls within a whole family of distributions, tlle Pierson
family. The Box-Cox trarsformation  is performed on the position of the exchange  rate in
the target zone.
10(4)
!t =  rof  ''  * tt1
\L, 
- t,)
Their transformation enjoys a number of advantages. First, the transformation is
unbounded despite the tatget zolae  and conventional estimation techniques are
appropriate.  Second"  this transformation locates the exchange  rate within  the bard
through the ratio of the distance of the exchange  rate within the band and the lower
limit  of the band to the distance of the exchaneg  rate within  the band and the upper
limit  of the band.
We can use least squares  to estimate the position of the exchange  rate within the
band in the following projection equation
yi =  ztP  re,
The independent variables Z can include any conditioning elements on 4.  We
include various measures  of interest rate differentials, past values of y,, and dummy
variables for realignments which took the form in the case  of Mexico of increasing the
rate of devaluation of the top of the band and for Chile the charges in the sizes  of the
bands.
The results  of this estimation  using  the Newey  and West (1985)  estimator  of the
variance-covariance  matrix appear in Table 1 for Mexico and Table 2 for Chile.
Although we will use this projection equation later to estimate confidence intervals for
(s)
11the expected realignment and depreciation within the band when gauging the credibility
of the target zones,  lhese results reveal an important characteristic of both target zones.
Specifically, the estimates  of the parameter B which measures  the persistence  of changes
in the exchange  rate within the band are significantly lesss  than one for both Mexico and
Chile.  This indicataes a large amount of mean reversion - that is, large positive
(negative) changes  in the deviation from central parity this today are offset by negative
(positive) deviations tomorrow.  We take this as  pima  facie evidence of Krugman's
(1991) "honeymoon effect" although such a conclusion is not as strong as previously
thought [Rose  and Svernson  1992].
Now we would like to estimate the shape  of the probability  distribution of x, using
equation (5).  To do this we look at the transformation





As in Giovannini and Chen (1992), we assume  that y has the standard  normal
distribution N(0,1).  Then the distribution of x, given the lower and upper bounds is
defined by the parameters y and 6.  When y  = 0, \  has a symmetric density function
while the density function converges  to the normal as 6 tends to infinity.
Once we have found these parameters we can estimate the distribution function of
x through  the chenge  in the variables  transformation
M =W,loo)  =  roo) (7)where  J is the Jacobian  matrix of y and  0O  is the standard  normal density  function.
Then the log likelihood function  for x, is
, =  Ehr.  Eh00J
TT
We maximize this likelihood function to estimate y and 6.  These estimates
appear in Table 3 for Mexico and Table 4 for Chile.  Using these estimates,  we
generated graphs of the density functions for the exchange  rate movements in the bands
pictured in Figures 5 and 6.  The Mexican density function is symmetric and almost
normal.  This mea:rs  that the Banco de Mexico tends to intervene inside the band
instead of when the exchange  rate reaches  the edge of the band.  On the other hand" the
dersity function of the Chilean band is bimodal and U-shaped. This is the shape
predicted by the Krugman model vr/ith  marginal intervention or intervention at the
boundaries.
The Credibility of the Target Zone
A pressing policy question for central banks concerns  the credibility  of the bands. Most
of these tests try to gauge  in some  way market expectations  about possible realignments
and therefore  are grounded  in uncovered  interest  rate parity (IUP).  A number  of
techniques have been developed. We will  concentrate on two of them.  The simplest
one w:rs developed by Svensson  (1991) who calculated credibility bounds on interest rates
(8)
13implied by UIP when the target zone is credible.  Using the notation of equation (3) and
assuming  the band is credible, that is the central parity depreciates  at the announced
rate  c- , then the maximum (Iog) interest rate differential  consistent  with a credible
target zorte,6*,  is determined by
6-".=c-+A1..,
Analogously the minimum interest rate differential  is
6.i"=d+Atdr (11)
where x-,  3  0.
These relationships can be written in level form as
(10)
i,.,=(r."(+)  t (12)
(13) i-.  = (1  +
where  S^  is the exchange  rate at top of the exchange  rate band, S.," is the exchange
rate at the bottom of the band,  and S,  is the spot  level of tle  exchange  rate. i-  is the
maximum domestic interest rate which is consistent  with a credible exchange  rate band
"(+)  '
14assuming  no risk premium applies and financial markets are perfectly integated.  The
bottom of the band (i-,)  is similarly calculated using the bottom of the exchange  rate
band.
Figure 7 shows  these bounds and 91 day CETES rates for Mexico during their
tar5et z,rllne  experience. The interpretation of the band is straight-forward.  If the
CETES interest rate is within the credibility ban4  the ergected rate of devaluation
reflected in interest rate differentials is consistent  with the exchange  rate staying  within
the target zone and, therefore, the target zone is credible.  If interest rates are above the
top of the credibility band, expected  devaluation brings the exchange  rate outside the
zone,  and,  the zone  lacks  credibility. One should  keep in nind  that this definition of
credibility is (overly) strict.  It  does not allow for risk premia and the like.
The interest rate moved closer and finally entered the credibility bound in late
February 1992 and,  stayed there until  May,  SubsequentlS  the peso moved to the top of
the exchange  rate band and interest  rates  rose  outside  the credibility band. The reinons,
described below, behind this reversal are many and do not necessarily  have anything to
do with credibility.  But this graph is an interesting gauge  of the credibility  of the current
exchange  rate regime.
Interest rates stayed outside of the band until  the appreciation of August widened
the credibility band to incorporate  the CETES rate. But the exchange  rate pressure  of
September  to November,  probably  related  to the U.S.  presidential  elections,  again
showed a marked lack of credibility of the band.  The decision to open the band faster in
November 1992  widened the credibility band as the peso appreciated and now the
15indicators are that the exchange  rate arrangement enjoys a high level of credibility.
Interestingly, the unprecedented reaction of the Mexican market accords  well with the
analysis  of Mcleod  and Welch (1991).
The Chilean credibility bounds are depicted in Figure 8.  In order to calculate
these bounds we must either assume  that arket has perfect foresight about the central
parity because  the central parity is adjusted according to past inflation  rates or we must
devise expectations  about this parity.  For the Svensson  (1991) tests,  we will  assume  that
the market knows the central parity three months ahead  with certainty.  However, the
economic interpretation  of these bounds is not as straight-forward as the Mexican graphs.
We will  deal more formally with this problem above. Unfortunately, the Svensson  (1991)
test generates  circular conclusions  in that the central parity is automatically adjusted to a
credible level and therefore is always  credible.
More formal credibility bounds can be generated from the probability
distributions generated above. We calculate 95Vo  confrdence  intervals around the
expected  value of x, by first calculating the expected deviation for central parity
t  -  -, ,,lxl  = 
J x/!.xt)tlx,
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We use these upper and lower bounds to calculate confidence intervals for
expected  realignment according to
El|c,lrealignmentl = 6, -  ElLx,lrc  realigmcntl 
(',)
-  lAcrlannuncedl
If 0 falls outside of these confidence intervals, the market is expecting a
realignment of the central parity and the exchange  rate regime is not credible.  When
zero falls within  these bounds, the exchange  rate is credible.
Figures  9 and 10  present  these  bounds  for Mexico and Chile which arc 95Vo
confidence intervals for expected  realignment.  For Mexico, they look almost the same as
the Svensson  tests and therefore we will  not describe tle  real time interpretation.
An interpretation  of the Chilean  bounds  (Figures  8, 1.0,  and 11)  is in order at this
point.  As mentioned above, speaking about credibility of the Chilean zone is dfficult
due to the continuous realignment of the central parity.  But we can gauge  in Figure 11
how well the private sector predicted the size and direction of these realignments. The
interbark  market in Chile predicted all but two major realignments. The first came at
the beginning of the period, 1985,  when the devaluation of the central parity was larger
than expected.  The second  came  at the end of the period, exly-I992, when the
(16)
t7appreciation of the central parity was larger than expected.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to extract some useful lessons  by both institutional  and
formal techniques from the use of unilateral exchange  rate target zones. The objectives
and the histories of the two taxget zones as well as the institutional  desigr were clearly
different in Mexico and Chile.  The increased  flexibility  of the Mexican elsfoenge  rate
has improved the credibility of the exchange  rate regime in Mexico and has not come at
the cost of slowing in the rate of decline in the inflation  rate.  The decision to widen the
band further has allowed Mexico to continue enjoyrng  large capital inflows and avoid a
collapse of it exchange  rate regime.  In Chile, the objective was to sustain  Asian style
exportled  growth.  Hence, the Chileans have tolerated perhaps a higher inflation  rate to
maintain export growth.
One common tendency in both countries is that both taxget zones have generated
substantial mean reversion within the band.  This has meant that interest rate variability
has  not been increased  as a function of exchange  rate policy and,  therefore  the policies
have been credible.  What is key here is that the bands have allowed enough flexibility  of
the exchange  rate to avoid destabilizing hot money flows and therefore exchange  rate
policies have not been destabilizing.  And, as inllation  has fallen, the central banks have
chosen  to allow the market to determine the exchange  rate as opposed to a fixed or
crawling peg which are entirely managed  by the central bank.
Of course,  none of this would be possible  without the incredible  fiscal  adjustment
18achieved in Mexico over the last decade and the prior  fiscal adjustment in Chile.  But
the analysis  begs the question: why did these countries wait so long lo move to a market
based exchange  rate?  Although a full  answer  goes  beyond the scope of this paper, we
feel the arswer lies in the state of development and liberalization of the financial
system-1  Financial liberalization in Mexico came only after fiscal adjustment and a
slowing of the inflation  rate.  A return to open financial market in Chile after the
collapse of  1982  only occurred after a full fiscal cornolidation including the
reorganization of failed banks." Low inflation  and fiscal consolidation have allowed the
financial markets in both countries to develop quickly, allowing a fuller  development of
the interbank market for foreign exchange  in addition to other financial instruments.
What seems  to be occurring in both Mexico and Chile is that these countries are
usitrg target zones to gradually move to market exchange  rates.  Such a use of target
zones stands in sharp contrast to the use in the EMS whose ultimate obiective was to
move to a uni{ied cunency.  The recent crumbling of such an effort and the experience
of Mexico and Chile indicates that target zones may be better instrument for moving to
flexible rather rhan fixed exchange  rates,  Still, the evidence  is preliminary, especially in
the Mexican  case,  and deserves  more attention  from economic  researchers.
nFor  a more exhaustive  treatment,  see  Mcleod  and Welch (1991).
sOngoing  losses  at the central bank from this consolidation, the so-called "quasi-fiscal
deficit," has always  been matched by a Federal Govemment surplus. Also, a strict
system  of amortization has been in force since these interventions.  The recent inflow of
capital has all but eliminated this deficit as the central bank has sold these assets  when
sterilizing the capital inllow.
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i  = Chilean interest rate on 3 month CDs
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